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ABSTRACT 
 
Given the exponential growth in mobile phone usage, 
more businesses are adopting mobile communication 
strategies to engage with existing and potential customers. 
With 97% of all mobile marketing text messages being 
opened by their intended recipients, mobile text message 
marketing is both effective and lucrative. However, 
businesses must ensure that such messages comply with the 
Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), which 
generally prohibits sending unsolicited commercial text 
messages. Indeed, TCPA litigation has become the recent 
darling of class action lawyers due to uncapped statutory 
damages and is sure to increase with the heightened 
consent regulations promulgated by the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC), effective October 16, 
2013. However, businesses cannot escape liability simply 
by obtaining prior express consent, as more businesses are 
being forced into multi-million dollar settlements for 
exceeding the scope of consent granted by their mobile 
customers. This Article examines recent trends in how the 
FCC and the courts are delineating the contours of consent 
for mobile text messaging under the TCPA and provides 
ways businesses can engage with mobile customers without 
running afoul of the TCPA. 
* Misa K. Bretschneider, University of Washington School of Law, J.D., 
with honors, 2014. Thank you to William Covington for his invaluable guidance 
and support, and Barry E. Bretschneider for his generous feedback.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
2014 is shaping up to be an explosive year in Telephone 
Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) mobile text messaging litigation. 
Recently, the Buffalo Bills NFL team approved a $3 million 
settlement for sending three too many text messages to the team’s 
mobile subscribers over a two-week period in violation of the 
TCPA.1 The takeaway message is clear: businesses and their 
counsel need to be vigilant about TCPA compliance and ensure 
that all mobile text communications fall within the scope of 
consent provided by the customer.2 However, the available 
guidance is far from clear, given that the TCPA is silent as to what 
forms of mobile communications are permissible.3 For instance, if 
1 Don’t Text & Cheer: Fan Sues Buffalo Bills for $3 Million, U.S. 
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE BLOG (May 12, 2014, 11:04 am), 
https://www.uschamber.com/blog/don-t-text-cheer-fan-sues-buffalo-bills-3-
million.  
2 While the TCPA is arguably the most important federal law applicable to 
mobile marketing, it is important to note the existence of other relevant 
consumer protection rules beyond the scope of this Article, such as the Federal 
Trade Commission’s analogous Telemarketing Sales Rule (TSR). See generally 
William B. Baker, The Complications of Doing Mobile Marketing Legally, 17 
NO. 8 J. INTERNET L. 13 (2014).  
3 See, e.g., In the Matter of GroupMe, Inc./ Skype Commc'ns Petition for 
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a customer consents to participating in a text-based social network, 
can the network then send the customer an administrative text 
message confirming the customer’s interest without violating the 
TCPA?4 
In recent years, the FCC and the courts are increasingly 
determining the scope of consent required from the context of a 
given mobile transaction in light of reasonable consumer 
expectations and industry norms.5 While this shift towards a more 
common sense approach is effectively expanding the scope of 
consent for mobile communications, businesses and their counsel 
must continue to closely monitor FCC declaratory rulings and 
court decisions to properly assess compliance risks. This Article 
examines emerging trends in delineating the scope of consent for 
mobile text messages under the TCPA. Part I describes the 
rationale and relevant rules governing consent under the TCPA. 
Part II then analyzes two recent FCC declaratory rulings and three 
recent court decisions. Finally, Part III focuses on three common 
instances where unwary businesses can exceed the scope of 
consent granted by their mobile customers, and provides 
recommendations for minimizing such risks.  
 
I. THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 
 
In 1991, Congress enacted the TCPA to protect consumers 
from the growing numbers of telemarketing calls and faxes that 
Expedited Declaratory Ruling Rules & Regulations Implementing the Tel. 
Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 59 Communications Reg. (P & F) 1554 (F.C.C. 
Mar. 27, 2014) (finding that the TCPA is ambiguous as to how a consumer’s 
consent should be obtained); see also Michael O’Rielly, TCPA: It’s Time to 
Provide Clarity, OFFICIAL FCC BLOG (Mar. 25, 2014), http://www.fcc.gov/blog/ 
tcpa-it-time-provide-clarity (“[TCPA’s] lack of clarity [is] evidenced by an 
increasing number of TCPA-related law suits and a growing backlog of petitions 
pending at the FCC.”).  
4 Although the FCC determined in a March 27, 2014 declaratory ruling that 
such texts are proper under the TCPA, other consent issues remain, such as 
whether consent is extinguished for reassigned phone numbers.  
5 See, e.g., Aderhold v. Car2go N.A., LLC, No. C12–489RAJ, 2014 WL 
794802, at *8 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 27, 2014) (“Many courts . . . have nonetheless 
found consent to send text messages based on the context of the transaction in 
which a consumer provides her cellular number.”). 
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one TCPA sponsor deemed the “scourge of modern civilization.”6 
However, rather than prohibit all forms of commercial 
communications, Congress “aimed to strike a balance between 
protecting consumers from unwanted communications and 
enabling legitimate businesses to reach out to consumers that wish 
to be contacted.”7 As a result, both the FCC and the courts grant 
considerable weight to legislative intent when analyzing a TCPA 
case.8  
In relevant part, the TCPA prohibits businesses from making 
any mobile “call” without the “prior express consent” of the 
customer with limited exceptions, such as calls made for 
emergency purposes.9 The prohibition of “calls” extends to text 
messages, such as those sent via Short Message Service (SMS), as 
well as voice calls.10 While the TCPA does not define what 
constitutes “prior express consent,” Congress delegated authority 
to the FCC to establish rules and regulations to implement the 
TCPA, whereby the FCC's interpretations of TCPA are controlling 
unless invalidated by a court of appeals.11 Accordingly, federal 
district courts consistently refer to the FCC's interpretation of the 
TCPA when deciding TCPA cases.12 
6 See, e.g., Telemarketing and Robocalls, FCC ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
http://www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/telemarketing (last visited Aug. 22, 2014).  
7 O’Rielly, supra note 3. 
8 See, e.g., Aderhold, 2014 WL 794802, at *4 (“[T]hose courts, and others, 
have been guided by the legislative purposes of the TCPA.”); see also In the 
Matter of GroupMe, Inc./ Skype Commc'ns Petition for Expedited Declaratory 
Ruling Rules & Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 
59 Communications Reg. (P & F) 1554 (F.C.C. Mar. 27, 2014) [hereinafter 
GroupMe] (exercising discretion to interpret the consent requirement by looking 
to the legislative goals underlying the TCPA). 
9 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B). 
10 See, e.g., Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 954 (9th 
Cir. 2009) (affording deference to FCC's interpretation of the TCPA that a text 
message is a “call” within the TCPA). 
11 See 28 U.S.C. § 2342 (the “Hobbs Act”); see also Baird v. Sabre Inc., No. 
CV 13-CV–999 SVW, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11246, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 
2014) (stating that under the Hobbs Act, the federal courts of appeals have 
exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of final FCC orders). 
12 However, it is important to note that FCC Declaratory Rulings are not 
binding on courts, and thus may serve only as a source of persuasion. See, e.g., 
Dish Network, L.L.C. v. FCC, 552 Fed. Appx. 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
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While non-telemarketing messages, such as purely 
informational and non-commercial messages, require “prior 
express consent,” heightened TCPA consent rules effective 
October 16, 2013,13 require businesses to obtain a consumer’s 
“prior express written consent” before sending a telemarketing 
message.14 The writing requirement can be met through any legally 
recognized electronic or digital form, such as one that conforms to 
E-SIGN.15 Notably, the inclusion of the writing requirement adds 
an extra hurdle for businesses seeking permissible consent: 
whereas businesses can obtain “prior express consent” either 
explicitly or implicitly through any reasonable method,16 they must 
explicitly obtain “prior express written consent” by obtaining clear 
written consent authorizing the delivery of specified telemarketing 
messages.17 Thus, a business can unwittingly exceed the scope of 
consent if, despite obtaining prior express consent, it sends a text 
message to a customer that does not fully comply with the terms 
provided for in the written consent agreement. 
As aforementioned, the vast majority of TCPA claims focus on 
non-consent cases. The reason for the popularity of such cases is 
that prior express consent is an affirmative defense and businesses 
13 The revised TCPA Rules provide for other revisions, such as elimination 
of the "established business relationship" exemption for certain telemarketing 
calls. Other notable changes provide that a seller cannot require the consumer to 
consent to receive an automatic telephone dialing system call as a condition for 
a purchase. 
14 Federal Communications Commission, “Rules and Regulations 
Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991,” Report and 
Order, FCC 12-21 at ¶ 15 (Feb. 15, 2012); 47 CFR § 64.1200(f)(8) (“The term 
prior express written consent means an agreement, in writing, bearing the 
signature of the person called that clearly authorizes the seller to deliver or cause 
to be delivered to the person called advertisements or telemarketing messages 
using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded 
voice, and the telephone number to which the signatory authorizes such 
advertisements or telemarketing messages to be delivered.”). 
15 See generally 29 IAN C. BALLON, E-COMMERCE AND INTERNET LAW: 
TREATISE WITH FORMS (2nd ed. 2014). 
16 See GroupMe, supra note 8, at 3 (“[N]either the Commission’s 
implementing rules nor its orders require any specific method by which a caller 
must obtain such prior express consent for non-telemarketing calls to wireless 
phones.”).  
 
                                                                                                             
5
Bretschneider: The Evolving Landscape of TCPA Consent Standards and Ways to Mini
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2014
6 WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 10:1 
bear the burden of demonstrating that they obtained proper prior 
express written consent from the customers.18 Accordingly, in 
defending against a TCPA non-consent claim, a business must 
either show that the mobile marketing text message fell within the 
scope of consent provided or was altogether exempted from the 
TCPA.  
 
II. DELINEATING THE SCOPE OF CONSENT 
 
In light of Congress’s intent that the TCPA “not be a barrier to 
normal, expected, and desired business communications,”19 both 
the FCC and the courts have increasingly adopted a more common 
sense approach to evaluating consent for text message 
communications. While a common sense approach effectively 
broadens the scope of consent, defining the precise contours of 
consent is anything but common sense. This Part will provide 
some clarity by analyzing two FCC declaratory rulings and three 
court cases addressing prior express consent for mobile text 
messaging under the TCPA. 
 
A.  2014 FCC Rulings 
 
On March 27, 2014 the FCC released two declaratory rulings 
concerning GroupMe, Inc. (GroupMe) and Cargo Airline 
Association (CAA) that provided insight into the FCC’s viewpoint 
on expanding consent to intermediaries and exempting certain text 
messages from the TCPA, respectively. While the rulings contain 
important caveats and have limited application given the fact-
intensive holdings, both rulings are favorable to businesses and 
imply a trend towards a less strict and more practical interpretation 
18 See Olney v. Job.com, Inc., 1:12-CV-01724-LJO, 2014 WL 1747674, at 
*3 (E.D. Cal. May 1, 2014) (citing Pinkard v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., No. 3:12–
CV–2902–CLS, 2012 WL 5511039, at *3 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 9, 2012)) (“Prior 
express consent is an affirmative defense, meaning that the defendant bears the 
burden of proving it.”). 
19 See, e.g., GroupMe, supra note 8, at 3; see also H.R. REP. NO. 102-317, at 
17 (1991) (“The restriction . . . does not apply when the called party has 
provided the telephone number of such a line to the caller for use in normal 
business communications.”). 
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of prior express written consent under the TCPA.  
The GroupMe declaratory ruling involved a free group text 
messaging service that allows a customer, per GroupMe’s terms 
and conditions, to create a group after representing that each 
individual added to the group has consented to be added and to 
receive text messages. In turn, GroupMe then sends group 
members up to four non-telemarketing text messages related to 
using and canceling GroupMe’s group texting service. In relevant 
part, GroupMe petitioned the FCC to clarify whether these non-
telemarketing text messages sent to group members, whereby 
consent was obtained through a group organizer intermediary, 
were proper under the TCPA.  
In response, the FCC concluded that in this context,20 (1) the 
administrative texts did not violate the TCPA because the texts 
constituted “normal business communications” to be expected and 
desired by the consenting customer, and (2) consent obtained via 
an intermediary was proper because such consent facilitated these 
normal business communications that the TCPA was not designed 
to prevent.21 In acknowledging that a customer’s consent “extends 
to a wide range of calls ‘regarding’ that transaction,”22 the FCC 
found that when a customer voluntarily provides her number to a 
group organizer for participating in a GroupMe group, the 
GroupMe administrative texts are sufficiently related to the 
underlying business transaction, and thus fall within the scope of 
consent provided by the customer. 
In its CAA ruling,23 the FCC went a step further and altogether 
exempted certain free-to-the-end-user notification text messages 
that a package delivery company sent to customers. Although it 
could have based the ruling just on an intermediary consent 
20 The holding had the important limitation that a group organizer may only 
convey the consumer’s prior express consent and that GroupMe was still liable 
for breaching the TCPA if the group organizer had not in fact obtained proper 
consent. However, this only imposed a condition and not a limitation on the 
scope of consent. 
21 GroupMe, supra note 8, at 4. 
22 Id. 
23 In the Matter of Cargo Airline Association Petition for Expedited 
Declaratory Ruling Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone 
Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 2014 WL 1266071 [hereinafter CAA Order]. 
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theory,24 the FCC instead exempted such text messages from the 
TCPA, under certain pro-consumer conditions,25 on grounds that 
such text messages would protect consumer’s privacy interests 
while improving the odds of a successful delivery. Similar to its 
approach in GroupMe, the FCC looked to the realities of the 
package delivery industry and consumer trends in concluding that 
alternative modes of communication would be unduly burdensome 
and unnecessary for package delivery companies and their 
customers.26  
Despite their fact-intensive holdings, both rulings support the 
FCC’s increasing openness to adopting a definition of consent that 
protects normal business communications bearing a sufficient 
nexus to the underlying consented transaction, even if a consumer 
does not individually consent to a given communication and does 
not give direct consent to the sender of the text. Indeed, as 
businesses are expanding their communications channels in 
response to increasing consumer expectations for more 
personalized brand experiences, the FCC will likely continue to 
expand its interpretation of consent to accommodate such evolving 
communications.27 However, the FCC has also been explicit that 
any allowances or exemptions to consent be message-specific, and 
any business exceeding this scope to even the smallest degree will 
be liable.28  
 
B.  2014 Court Rulings 
 
In comparison to the FCC, the courts have historically been 
more resistant to expanding the definition of consent under the 
24 Id. at 3. 
25 Id. at 5 (exempting CAA’s messages from the TCPA under seven 
conditions, including that text messages not contain any advertising component 
and must include opt-out procedures). 
26 Id. (finding that evidence of residential consumers' experience, who 
already receive these notifications and have not complained to the FCC, 
supports exempting such communications from the TCPA). 
27 See generally Robert Passikoff, Brand and Marketing Trends for 2014, 
FORBES (Dec. 4, 2013, 11:27 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertpassikoff/ 
2013/12/04/brand-and-marketing-trends-for-2014/.  
28 See, e.g., CAA Order, supra note 23, at 5. 
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TCPA. For instance, courts have differed on whether express 
consent can be implied from the customer’s mere act of providing 
a cellphone number.29 However, the emerging judicial trend is 
towards a more business-friendly approach that focuses on 
industry-specific consumer expectations and business norms. 
Furthermore, although the courts still privilege consumer 
protection in light of the TCPA’s rationale, the courts are holding 
customers to a “reasonable consumer” standard that assumes an 
arguably savvy and informed customer. 
For instance, in Baird v. Sabre, the court found that a customer, 
in providing her mobile telephone number to complete a flight 
reservation, had “voluntarily” provided her number, and thus 
consented to receive flight-related notification text messages from 
both the flight company and its third-party contractors. The 
customer argued that she felt compelled to provide her number in 
order to finalize the sale and that a reasonable consumer would 
“not naturally assume” that she expressly consented to be 
contacted at that number by a third party contractor. However, the 
court disagreed by adopting a reasonable airline customer standard. 
Specifically, the court found that a “reasonable consumer” would 
understand that consenting to receive a flight-related text message 
from the airline’s contractor “fell within the scope of her prior 
express consent.” In its holding, the court assumed that the average 
airline customer was a fairly well-informed customer who would 
understand the complex dynamics of modern advertising, even if 
the actual customer was not in fact so savvy.30 
Similarly, in Aderhold v. Car2go, the court refused to take a 
narrow view of prior express consent.31 In registering for a Car2go 
29 E.g., Leckler v. CashCall, Inc., 554 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (N.D. Cal. 2008), 
vacated, 2008 WL 5000528 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2008) (expressing doubts about 
FCC’s analysis granting “implied consent” that “flies in the face of Congress’ 
intent”). But see Baird v. Sabre Inc., No. CV 13-CV–999 SVW, 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 11246, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2014) (sympathizing with Leckler 
court’s doubts regarding FCC’s interpretation but nevertheless deferring to 
FCC’s definition of consent). 
30 Baird v. Sabre Inc., No. CV 13-CV–999 SVW, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
11246, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2014). 
31 Aderhold v. Car2go N.A., LLC, No. C12–489RAJ, 2014 WL 794802, at 
*8 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 27, 2014). 
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membership, the customer entered his mobile contact number and 
affirmatively clicked three boxes to accept Car2go’s policies. 
Car2go’s policies, which were contained in three separate 
documents, specified that Car2go would later “confirm acceptance 
of the application.”32 Although Car2go’s policies did not explicitly 
state that it would send the customer a text message containing 
activation instructions, the court found that “no reasonable person 
in his shoes could have doubted that Car2go would contact him in 
some manner.”33 Accordingly, the court found that the message 
contacting the customer was “closely related” to the underlying 
membership activation agreement since its purpose was to finalize 
membership, and thus fell within the scope of the customer’s 
consent. Moreover, the court concluded that even if Car2go made 
no disclosures regarding how it would use the customer’s 
cellphone number, it “defie[d] logic to contend that [the customer] 
did not consent to be contacted regarding his membership 
application.”34  
In contrast, in Sherman v. Yahoo!, the court denied Yahoo!’s 
motion for summary judgment, finding that it was an issue of fact 
whether a single notification text message to a consumer as part of 
Yahoo!’s Instant Messenger service was sent without the 
consumer’s consent because neither Yahoo! nor the third party 
who facilitated the text message obtained the consumer’s prior 
consent.35 Unlike the customers in Baird and Car2go, who 
received a single text message directly related to a consumer-
initiated transaction, the customer in Sherman did not initiate the 
service, and thus it was not clear that they did not expect or desire 
to receive a message from Yahoo!.36 The Sherman court affirmed 
that “[c]ontext is indisputably relevant to determining whether a 
particular [message] is actionable” and concluded that the context 
underlying the transaction did not explicitly or impliedly support a 
finding of consent.37 
32 Id. at 5. 
33 Id. at 6. 
34 Id. 
35 Sherman v. Yahoo! Inc., 2014 WL 369384, *1 (S.D. Cal. 2014). 
36 Id. at 5. 
37 Id. at 6. 
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In all three cases, the courts adopted a fact-intensive inquiry 
rooted in common sense that aimed to balance consumer privacy 
and normal business communications. While the cases presented 
different fact scenarios, the decisions hinged primarily on three 
things: (1) the precise language contained in the disclosure 
documents, (2) the purpose and timing of the text message, and (3) 
the relationship between the sender and initiator of the text 
message. Part III of this Article discusses ways that businesses and 
their counsel can mitigate TCPA risk regarding text message 
communications, in light of the aforementioned factors. 
 
III. MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF CONSENT 
 
Despite the recent FCC and court rulings providing a broader 
and more practical reading of consent, businesses and their counsel 
must remain vigilant to prevent erroneously exceeding prior 
express consent under the TCPA.38 This Part highlights three 
common instances where businesses can exceed the scope of a 
customer’s prior express consent under the TCPA and recommends 
ways to mitigate such risk.39 
 
 
38 It is important to note that aside from limited exceptions, the TCPA does 
not preempt state laws that impose more restrictive requirements. See, e.g., 
Patriotic Veterans, Inc. v. State of Indiana, No. 11-3265, 2013 WL 6114836 (7th 
Cir. Nov. 21, 2013) (finding that Congress did not intend to create preemption 
when it enacted the TCPA). Indeed, Connecticut recently enacted a mini-TCPA 
state statute that mirrors the TCPA but provides for statutory damages of up to 
$20,000 per violation. See, e.g., Strengthened Connecticut Law Supplements 
TCPA, KILPATRICK TOWNSEND (June 3, 2014), 
http://www.kilpatricktownsend.com/en/Knowledge_Center/Alerts_and_Podcasts
/Legal_Alerts/2014/06/Strengthened_Connecticut_Law_Supplements_TCPA.as
px. Thus, although beyond the scope of this Article, it is critical to closely watch 
both state and federal developments in the area of mobile marketing text 
messages. 
39 While most of the cited cases directly concern text message 
communications, a few relate to mobile phone calls, and thus inferences will be 
drawn by analogy. See, e.g., Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 
954 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding that a “voice message or a text message are not 
distinguishable in terms of being an invasion of privacy” under the TCPA). 
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A.  Language in Disclosure Documents 
 
The first way that businesses and their counsel can protect 
against TCPA consent claims is to ensure that their mobile text 
communications do not exceed, even in the slightest degree, the 
conditions set forth in their customer disclosures governing such 
communications.  
The courts meticulously analyze a business’s disclosure 
documents, such as the terms and conditions, privacy policy, and 
registration documents, to determine whether the given text 
message communication falls within the scope of these 
disclosures.40 It is not necessary that the disclosures related to the 
text message communication be explicitly stated and neatly 
contained in one document. Indeed, the disclosures may be spread 
across multiple documents and contain a general statement, such as 
“the business will confirm acceptance of the application,” without 
explicitly stating the precise mode of communication.41  
However, should a business choose to use precise language in 
its disclosure documents, a court will hold the business to that 
precise standard. For example, a business disclosing that it will text 
a customer up to five text messages per week will likely be held to 
that exact number, and any text messages exceeding this number, 
even one, will likely be read as exceeding the scope of the 
customer’s consent under the TCPA.42 Accordingly, to prevent an 
erroneous deviation, it is best practice for businesses to use 
general, rather than specific, language in their disclosure 
documents. 
 
40 See, e.g., Aderhold v. Car2go N.A., LLC, No. C12–489RAJ, 2014 WL 
794802, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 27, 2014) (closely analyzing Terms and 
Conditions, Trip Process, and Privacy Policy documents controlling customer’s 
membership application and subsequent participation in the trip process). 
41 Id. at 6. 
42 Don’t Text & Cheer: Fan Sues Buffalo Bills for $3 Million, U.S. 
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE BLOG (May 12, 2014, 11:04 am), 
https://www.uschamber.com/blog/don-t-text-cheer-fan-sues-buffalo-bills-3-
million. 
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B.  Purpose and Timing of Text Messages 
 
In addition, businesses and their counsel must ensure that the 
purpose and timing of any text message communication are 
consistent with the customer’s consent. 
First, the purpose of a text message communication may be for 
promotional or informational purposes, or a combination of the 
two. A message containing a mix of telemarketing and non-
telemarketing information constitutes a “dual purpose” message. 
Courts closely analyze messages and will find that a message 
contains a promotional element if there is either a direct or implied 
sales offer.43 Accordingly, if a customer only consents to receiving 
an informational message, the business cannot then send a 
promotional44 or a dual-purpose message.45  
On the other hand, courts are more forgiving about the content 
of a given informational text message, finding that the “TCPA 
does not require the call to be for the exact purpose for which the 
number was provided.”46 However, the content of the message 
must bear sufficient relation to the product or service for which the 
customer provided her number. Accordingly, businesses must 
ensure that any text message relates to the same or a closely 
connected product or service. Furthermore, as mentioned before, a 
heightened level of consent is required for telemarketing messages. 
Thus, businesses must ensure that the purpose of a text message 
43 Chesbro v. Best Buy Stores Inc., 697 F.3d 1230, as amended by 705 F.3d 
913 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding that a text message warning of the expiration of 
rewards points, and instructing how to preserve them, was a telemarketing 
message). 
44 See e.g., Connelly, et al., v. Hilton Grand Vacations Co., LLC, 2012 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS at *11 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (holding that hotel company sending 
promotional texts to customers, who made hotel reservations and submitted their 
cell phone numbers, exceeded the scope of consent). 
45 See, e.g., Chesbro v. Best Buy Stores L.P., 705 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(finding that scope of consent was exceeded when consent was given for only 
informational calls, but business later sent dual-purpose call). 
46 See, e.g., Olney v. Job.com, Inc., 1:12-CV-01724-LJO, 2014 WL 
1747674, at *6 (E.D. Cal. May 1, 2014) (noting that educational company could 
send educational-related calls, finding that employment-related calls may be 
sufficiently related to underlying transaction, depending on the factual 
circumstances). 
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communication is compliant with both the dual TCPA standards 
and the customer’s consent. 
Second, regarding timing, businesses must be careful that they 
send text messages and obtain a customer’s mobile number within 
a proper timeframe. For instance, the FCC ruled that only 
confirmatory messages sent within five minutes of an opt-out 
request will be presumed to fall within the scope of a customer’s 
consent, and the sender bears the burden of showing any delay was 
in fact reasonable.47 Furthermore, a business must ensure that it 
receives a customer’s mobile contact information before the 
finalization of the business transaction.48 Accordingly, the 
inflexible timeframe means that businesses must ensure that proper 
mechanisms are in place to acquire customers’ mobile numbers 
and send mobile communications in a timely fashion. 
 
C.  Third Party Affiliates 
 
The final way that businesses and their counsel can protect 
against TCPA consent claims is to ensure that all text message 
communications are sent by third parties closely affiliated with the 
business, where the content of such communication bears a 
sufficient relation to the service or product for which the customer 
provided her number.49 Even if the consumer did not explicitly 
consent to receiving text messages from an affiliated entity, courts 
will apply a “reasonable customer” standard in determining 
whether a customer’s consent extends to receiving messages from 
third-party contractors. In recent cases, courts have extended the 
scope of consent to third-party messages related to the transaction 
47 In the Matter of SoundBite Communications Petition for Expedited 
Declaratory Ruling Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone 
Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 27 F.C.C.R. 15391, 15391, 2012 WL 
5986338. 
48 See Meyer v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, 696 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 
2012) (finding that procurement of cell phone number after original business 
transaction does not amount to proper consent under the TCPA). 
49 See, e.g., Baird v. Sabre Inc., No. CV 13-CV–999 SVW, 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 11246 (C.D. Cal. Jan.28, 2014) (finding that text messages sent from an 
airline’s third part vendor concerning flight-related matters fell within the scope 
of consent that the customer gave to the airline). 
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that a reasonable customer could assume and expect to receive, but 
courts have not extended the scope of consent to messages sent by 
a completely unaffiliated company in a separate industry.50  
Furthermore, if a third party hired by a business sends a mobile 
marketing text message without consent to a consumer in violation 
of the TCPA, the business may be held vicariously liable under 
federal common law agency principles.51 Indeed, no formal agency 
relationship is required for liability, and a business can also be held 
liable through the principles of apparent authority or ratification.52 
Accordingly, businesses and their counsel must pay attention to 
reasonable consumer expectations and their relationships with third 
party senders when initiating mobile marketing text messages. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The FCC’s and courts’ recent adoption of a common sense 
analysis will allow businesses to more freely communicate with 
their mobile customers, so long as such communications align with 
reasonable consumer expectations and established business norms. 
However, businesses and their counsel must implement 
comprehensive safeguards to protect against TCPA consent claims. 
Because courts are split on good faith defenses,53 it is necessary 
not to make any assumptions regarding consent, even if made in 
good faith. Accordingly, as it is likely that the FCC and the courts 
will continue to expand the scope of consent under the TCPA, it is 
a smart business practice to adapt consent and disclosure policies 
in a piecemeal fashion to the evolving TCPA legal landscape.  
 
50 See Satterfield, supra note 38, at 955 (concluding that text messages sent 
from a cellphone provider’s unaffiliated publishing company concerning 
publishing related matters fell outside the scope of consent that consumer 
provided to cellphone provider). 
51 See, e.g., In re DISH Network, LLC, 2013 WL 1934349, FCC 13-54 
(May 9, 2013). 
52 Id. 
53 See, e.g., Olney v. Job.com, Inc., 1:12-CV-01724-LJO, 2014 WL 
1747674, at *8 (E.D. Cal. May 1, 2014) (noting that while some courts have 
suggested that the TCPA is a strict liability statute, other courts have allowed for 
a good faith exception to liability). 
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PRACTICE POINTERS 
 
 Since the statute of limitations for a federal TCPA claim is 
four years, it is important to keep records of customer 
consent for at least four years.  
 When in doubt, do not make any assumptions. Although 
the FCC’s effort to clarify the TCPA through declaratory 
rulings is not very efficient, one option is to petition the 
FCC for an expedited declaratory ruling. 
 The consent rules are merely a floor. Just because a form of 
mobile communication may be permitted under the TCPA 
does not prevent customers from finding such 
communications annoying and seeking out competitors 
with less invasive communication strategies. 
 In the event of a TCPA consent claim, argue that the text 
message was within the scope of consent provided and that 
consent in such case would not frustrate TCPA’s 
underlying rationale. 
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